

This facility also have [sic] not been complying with (Bounds) about access to the courts. I have been denied access to the courts for a year now. Lt. Bill Cope told me I have no right to law books or a law library. So I wrote a request asking for specific material and still did not get help. This resulted in me losing [sic] a case that I could have won. I was convicted in violation of the law. I was denied access to the courts and lost a non frivolous claim because of it

(Docket Entry No. 1, ¶ IV, p. 5)(unnecessary/improper capitalization omitted).

II. ANALYSIS

To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege and show: 1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and 2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. *Parratt v. Taylor*, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)(overruled in part by *Daniels v. Williams*, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986)); *Flagg Bros. v. Brooks*, 436 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1978); *Black v. Barberton Citizens Hosp.*, 134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998). Both parts of this two-part test must be satisfied to support a claim under § 1983. See *Christy v. Randlett*, 932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991).

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), the courts are required to dismiss a prisoner's complaint if it is determined to be frivolous, malicious, or if it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Although the courts are required to construe *pro se* complaints liberally, see *Boag v. MacDougall*, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982), under the PLRA, the "courts have no discretion in permitting a plaintiff to amend a complaint to avoid a *sua sponte* dismissal," *McGore v. Wigglesworth*, 114 F.3d 601, 612 (6th Cir. 1997).

As previously noted, *supra* at p.1 and n.1, the plaintiff is suing the only two defendants in this action, Sheriff Jones and Lt. Cope, in their official capacities only. A lawsuit filed against a county official in his official capacity is deemed to be a suit against the county itself. See *Hafer v.*

Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-26 (1991); *Marchese v. Lucas*, 758 F.2d 181, 189 (6th Cir. 1985)(citing *Brandon v. Holt*, 469 U.S. 464 (1985)).

For the County of Rutherford to be liable under § 1983, the plaintiff must claim that the alleged violations of his constitutional rights stemmed from a county policy, regulation, decision, custom, or the tolerance of a custom of such violations. Otherwise, a § 1983 claim will not lie. *See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris*, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989); *Monell v. New York City Department of Soc. Serv's*, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978); *Doe v. Claiborne County, Tenn.*, 103 F.3d 495, 507-09 (6th Cir. 1996). The plaintiff does not allege, nor can it be liberally construed from the pleadings, that any such county policy, regulation, decision, custom, or tolerance of a custom of such violations was responsible for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. The less stringent standard for *pro se* plaintiffs does not compel the courts to conjure up unpled facts where none exist. *See Wells v. Brown*, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, the County of Rutherford has no liability under § 1983.

III. CONCLUSION

As reasoned above, the plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

An appropriate Order will be entered.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert L. Echols", written in a cursive style.

Robert L. Echols
United States District Judge